Special Conference Issue: Edited jointly by Michael Blecher, Giuseppe Bronzini, Jennifer Hendry, Christian Jeorges and the EJLSDownload pdf version
“Corruption is often discussed in the kinds of language and symbolism reserved for life-threatening diseases.” The World Bank insists that it “has identified corruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development.” This is problematic, as no one seems to have found a universal definition of corruption. Nor is there absolute consensus on what types of behaviour within a loose definition are harmful. Johnson, however, argues that in some respects there is too much consensus. “The new wave of concern has been driven primarily by business and by international aid and lending institutions. While there is nothing inherently wrong with that, their vision of corruption, like any other, is partial.”
It is widely acknowledged that social security and labour rights protection systems are increasingly beginning to fail, even in Europe where they initially began. During the three Keynesian decades, these systems have both achieved constitutional status and proved to be extremely successful in tempering the excesses of capitalistic accumulation; however, many authors suspect that the so-called post-Fordist era holds little more for labour than an unforeseen growth in lawlessness.
“There’s no certainty - only opportunity.” Alan Moore, V for Vendetta
This article is an attempt to highlight the passage from the rather “embedded” role “conceded” to social movements by major concepts of social organisation to a different understanding of social movements as “re-claiming the common” throughout and beyond colliding social spheres. With respect to law, we are now moving from what Luhmann called “justice as adequate complexity” to what I call, with loose reference to Deleuze, “Justice as Continuous Becoming” and “Law in Movement”. The following steps of the governance debate have brought us to this point:
Over the last fifteen years, “governance” has emerged as a research agenda in international relations theory. The term “governance” has been used as a kind of catch-all term to refer to any strategy, tactic, process, procedure or programme for controlling, regulating, shaping, mastering or exercising authority over others in a nation, organization or locality. Governance tends to be judged good when political strategies seek to minimize the role of the state, to encourage non-state mechanisms of regulation, to reduce the size of the political apparatus and civil service, to introduce “the new public management”, to change the role of politics in the management of social and economic affairs.
The only way to critically enter the world of the “normatively fragmented” – by which I mean, to step inside the legal reality of crisis and/or transformation that is dominant today – or rather, taking the reverse perspective, the world of “social constitutionalism” as discussed by Sciulli and Teubner, is perhaps (but, as I will argue later, this ‘perhaps’ may be deleted) to stress that the fragmentation of the normative world is accompanied by a constituent excess – although the manner of this accompaniment cannot be considered to be an isomorphic one, but rather is chaotic and non-sanctioned.
Globalised capitalism cannot be understood as being driven by economic processes alone. The alternative to conventional ideas of an economy-led form of globalisation is “polycentric globalisation”. The primary motor is an accelerated differentiation of society into autonomous social systems, each of which expands beyond territorial boundaries and constitutes itself globally. This process is not confined to markets alone but also encompasses science, culture, technology, health, the military, transport, tourism and sport, as well as, albeit in a clearly more restricted form, politics, law and welfare
The aim of this short conclusion is to discuss the final section of this journal issue, specifically the contributions of Michael Blecher, Antonio Negri and Gunther Teubner, in light of the overall theme of both the conference workshop and this special issue. To this end, I am aware that Blecher’s introduction has already raised a number of relevant points and it is not my intention to repeat them; rather, my aim is to identify and draw attention to the loci of agreement and disagreement across the three papers, some of which are obscured by the different perspectives on the topic.
On June 16 and 17 1997, in Amsterdam, notwithstanding the approval of a new Treaty, the summit of the European Councils failed to deliberate on the large institutional reforms the European Commission was hoping for. On the first day of the summit, a coalition of NGOs, unions and squatted centers staged a demonstration. The coalition European March for Unemployment mobilized 50,000 people that arrived from all over Europe to ask for policy measures against poverty, social exclusion and unemployment. In symbolic protest, about 500 young people reached Amsterdam on foot, having left from different European countries on Labour Day. During the days of the summits, groups of young activists distributed joints asking for free drogues in all Europe and gay associations marched in the red light district demanding equal rights. The headquarters of the Central Bank, where Heads of State, Ministries and dignitaries met, were protected by 5,000 policemen.
In the national context, talk of civil society has ceased. We are left with only a distant memory of the protest movements of the tumultuous 1980s; whatever there was to analyse and criticise has been analysed and criticised. But this appearance is deceptive because elsewhere, wars are being waged. Civil protests have ascended into the supra- and transnational realms. Civil society, in the form of organisations such as Amnesty, Attac, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the International Rivers Network and People’s Global Action, busies itself by uncovering the secrets of the opaque world of comitology – that network of EU advisory committees – and acts as a counterbalance to the prevailing forces of the globalised world of the UN, G7, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank.
Der Beitrag konzentriert sich auf das Verhältnis von Recht und Governance in Europa. Er entwickelt den von Jürgen Neyer und mir vor 10 Jahren unter dem Titel „Deliberativer Supranationalismus“ eingeführten Ansatz fort. Die rechtstheoretische Grundlage dieses Ansatzes ist die Habermasche Diskurstheorie des Rechts und deren Prozeduralisierung der Rechtskategorie. Auf dieser Grundlage ist es möglich, die Wende zum Regieren in rechtsstaatlichen Bahnen zu halten. Dies gilt grundsätzlich für alle Ebenen des Regierens, erfordert aber Differenzierungen. Die rechtlich vermittelte Legitimation, die das prozeduralisierte Recht im Verfassungsstaat gewährleisten kann, erfordert in postnationalen Konstellationen eine „kollisionsrechtliche“ Wende.
This contribution proposes – once it has brought the incommensurability of governance and international law into focus – to reconstruct a different interpretation of the very real phenomena that lie at the roots of this false question. First of all, it is necessary to focus briefly on the nature of international law, although without any pretense of resolving the theoretical battles resurfacing between legal monism and dualism within the internationalist doctrine. Such a boast would, in any case and in this author’s opinion, be futile since the vitality of the roots of dualism is evident in the present climate at the beginning of the millennium.